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In theory, a safe approach to an intersection implies that drivers can simultaneously
manage two scenarios: they either choose to cross or to give way to an oncoming vehicle.
In this article we formalize the critical time for safe crossing (CTcross) and the critical time
for safe stopping (CTstop) to represent crossing and stopping possibilities, respectively. We
describe these critical times in terms of affordances and empirically test their respective
contribution to the driver’s decision-making process. Using a driving simulator, three
groups of participants drove cars with identical acceleration capabilities and different
braking capabilities. They were asked to try to cross an intersection where there was
an oncoming vehicle, if they deemed the maneuver to be safe. If not, they could decide to
stop or, as a last resort, make an emergency exit. The intersections were identical among
groups. Results showed that although the crossing possibilities (CTcross) were the same
for all groups, there were between-group differences in crossing frequency. This suggests
that stopping possibilities (CTstop) play a role in the driver’s decision-making process, in
addition to the crossing possibilities. These results can be accounted for by a behavioral
model of decision making, and provide support for the hypothesis of choice between
affordances.
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INTRODUCTION
Driving a car is a typical situation in which an agent has to choose
the most suitable maneuver to perform from multiple alterna-
tives. For instance, when approaching an intersection, a driver
has to decide whether to cross (before the road is blocked by
oncoming traffic) or to stop. In this article, we argue that this
real-life driving situation can be used as a paradigm to investi-
gate a specific facet of decision making assuming that choice has
to be performed between co-existing affordances. As an exam-
ple of the hypothesis, imagine yourself driving a car that is not
the one you normally use. If the acceleration of both cars is
identical, then there is no apparent reason to change the way
you approach the intersection, as the opportunity to success-
fully cross the intersection depends on (among other things)
the car’s acceleration. However, would you cross the intersection
in the same way if the two cars had different braking capabili-
ties? Probably not. It can therefore be argued that drivers have
to choose between possibilities for crossing and stopping. We
assume that the decision-making process at the approach to an
intersection would initially consists in perceiving which maneu-
vers are possible and which are not, and secondly in selecting the
most suitable maneuver among available possibilities. Is this deci-
sion a function of the relative chance of success of each maneuver,
the fit betweenmaneuver and the agent’s aims and/or the risk they
pose to the driver’s life?
On the one hand, the perception of whether a behavior is
possible or not is central to the driver’s safety. For instance,
an attempt to cross the intersection could prove fatal if the
driver misjudges the acceleration of their car and the opportu-
nity to cross before oncoming traffic arrives. The ability of an
agent to perceive “action-scaled” affordances (the potential for
action defined by the environment with respect to the agent’s
ability to take action) has received increasing attention since
Gibson’s formulation of the theory of affordances (Gibson, 1977).
Previous work has investigated perception of the “pass-ability”
of a shrinking gap between converging obstacles (Fajen and
Matthis, 2011) and the “avoid-ability” of a collision by brak-
ing (Fajen, 2005a,b,c; Fajen and Devaney, 2006). These studies
have shown that relevant properties of the environment are per-
ceived in relation to the kinematic characteristics of the person’s
body or vehicle. From this perspective, the selection of the appro-
priate action entails scaling environmental properties (e.g., the
deceleration required to stop before hitting an obstacle) to the
action capabilities of the driver-car dyad (e.g., their maximum
deceleration).
On the other hand, the selection of one solution at the expense
of other alternatives is central to goal satisfaction. For instance,
if the driver is unable to cross an intersection, he/she must
select a second possible maneuver. The mechanisms that under-
lie the selection of the final decision have not been elucidated
(see Michaels, 2003 concerning debates in ecological psychol-
ogy). They may relate to their respective “valence” (Lewin et al.,
1936), or whether possible solutions are attractive or repul-
sive in terms of behavioral dynamics (Warren, 1998, 2006).
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Both of these perspectives imply that potential solutions have a
positive or negative meaning for the agent depending on their
goal.
Unfortunately, few experimental studies have investigated
action selection and affordance perception when different oppor-
tunities for action are available at the same time. Mark and
colleagues (Mark et al., 1997; Gardner et al., 2001; see also Mantel
et al., 2012 for a sketch of behavioral organization in presence of
coexisting action modes) explored how behavior is constrained
in presence of multiple affordances. They showed that when the
goal achievement (i.e., reaching an object) is not constrained
by a particular action mode (e.g., extending only the arm or
combining the use of arm plus torso and/or shoulder), the crit-
ical boundary at which participants naturally switch from an
action mode to another may change depending on postural con-
straints, accuracy requirements and comfort. However, this study
not only focuses on body-scaled affordances but is also restricted
to the choice among several affordances for the achievement
of a unique goal. Ye et al. (2009) went further in the multiple
affordances issue by investigating choice among several objects
affordances that satisfy various goals. They evidenced that the
perception of an object’s affordance affects the detection of the
other affordances offered by that object. Therefore, this study
completes the need of empirical investigation of how choices are
made among available affordances (see Stoffregen, 2003, 2004
for a definition of the affordance concept entailing a choice
between a large amount of affordances in the world). However,
the aforementioned studies do not consider some features of the
intersection crossing situation. Indeed, such a paradigm implies
a choice between action-scaled affordances (e.g., crossing vs.
stopping opportunities scaled in reference with action capabil-
ities) that concern antagonist goals (e.g., time saving vs. safe
keeping).
Driver behavior at intersections has received a lot of atten-
tion in the literature. Research has been carried out to identify
the ability of a stationary driver to detect whether there is a safe
gap to allow crossing between oncoming vehicles (See Caird and
Hancock, 2002 for a review). Lee et al. (1984) were the first to
our knowledge to take advantage of the affordance framework in
order to investigate the decision to cross or not in situations where
perception and action are coupled. They showed in a task con-
sisting in crossing or not by walking on a road through gaps in
traffic that adults accepted smaller gaps than children. Since per-
ceiving the affordance of gap in traffic entails perceiving the gap
with reference to the crossing time capabilities, the children’s cau-
tious behavior was attributed to their inconsistency in walking at
a constant speed through gaps. Plumert et al. (2011) moreover
evidenced in an intersection crossing task with bicycle that the
size of accepted gap tended to decrease with exposure. However,
these tasks do not entail managing simultaneously the crossing
and the stopping possibilities since walking and cycling allowed
instantaneous stopping in front of the traffic and also waiting
for an acceptable gap. As far as we know, requiring an agent
to choose between crossing, stopping or even turning around
to avoid a collision at an intersection does not seem to have
been investigated experimentally. Nevertheless, it is a highly rel-
evant paradigmatic task for understanding the decision-making
process.
Gibson and Crooks (1938) proposed a theoretical framework
capable of explaining driver’s behavior in such a situation. In this
seminal paper, they defined two major concepts: the Field of Safe
Travel (FST) defined as the “field of possible paths which the car
may take unimpeded” (p. 454), and the Minimum Stopping Zone
(MSZ) defined as the “zone within which our driver could stop if
he had to” (p. 457). Safe driving behavior was hypothesized to
be the driver’s response to the simultaneous perception of the
boundaries of these two spatiotemporal regions, which would
specify the driver’s current crossing and stopping possibilities.
Gibson and Crooks proposed that stopping-ability depends on
the relation between FST and MSZ. They suggested that such an
affordance can be formalized as the ratio between the FST and
the MSZ. This attention prefigures a great tradition in affordance
research about how to formalize an affordance (e.g., see Warren,
1984; Shaw et al., 1995 pioneering work on affordance model-
ing). According to this “field-zone ratio”, drivers take into account
all safe paths and behave in such a way that the set of positions
predicted by emergency braking is located in this field. However,
Gibson and Crooks did not explicitly consider crossing-ability
affordance and thus did not address the issue of what could be
the driver’s behavior when both crossing and stopping actions are
afforded.
In the present study, we argue that it may be possible to provide
a complete account of drivers’ decision-making process in terms
of choice between two or more co-existing possibilities. First, we
formalized critical times at which safe crossing and safe stopping
are no longer possible, based on Gibson and Crooks’ theoretical
description of the FST and the MSZ. Hereafter, we denote these
critical times CTcross and CTstop, respectively. Then, we investi-
gated empirically whether and how these times influence driving
behavior at an intersection. We designed a task where the driver’s
main goal is to safely cross an intersection. This task required
managing simultaneously the crossing and the stopping possi-
bilities unlike previously mentioned studies which only entailed
managing crossing possibilities (Lee et al., 1984; Plumert et al.,
2011). It is consequently assumed that the drivers will either try
to cross or stop depending on their capabilities. We predict that
if different possibilities for actions are simultaneously available,
the chance of success of each action will influence the driver’s
final decision. Specifically, drivers approaching an intersection
were asked to decide whether to cross or stop in situations where
crossing conditions were the same, but stopping conditions were
different. We predicted that in this scenario, the driver’s decision
about whether to cross would be different.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty experienced drivers (12 female, 18 male, aged 25.8 ± 2.8
years), who held a valid driver’s license gave their informed writ-
ten consent to participate to this experiment. They all had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and were not informed about the
purpose of the study. A local ethics committee approved the
experiment.
APPARATUS
Figure 1 is an overview of the experimental setup. Participants
sat in a fixed-base driving simulator (Mobsim, France). Their
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FIGURE 1 | Overview of the driving simulator and the virtual scene.
Participants are seated in a driving simulator in front of a large screen (2.3 × 3m)
and interactwith intersection crossing situations in a virtual reality environment.
They were instructed to try to cross the intersection before the car approaching
from the left by accelerating. Alternatively, they could stop before the
intersectionbybraking, or as a last resort they could exit into anemergency lane.
eye level was 1.1m above the floor and 1.5m in front of a large
screen (2.5 × 3.2m), which encompassed 94◦ of their horizon-
tal field of view. The action of their right foot on the brake and
accelerator pedals and their manipulation of the steering wheel
(ECCI Trackstar 6000 GTS) were monitored via a USB signal
sent to a host computer (Intel® Core™ i7-950 Processor @3.07
GHz; NVIDIA® GeForce® GTX 580 graphics card). Customized
OpenGL virtual reality software updated the virtual scene. The
virtual scene was rear-projected onto the screen by a video pro-
jector (Barco iQ R500) at a frame rate of 60Hz with a resolution
of 1152 × 864 pixels. No speedometer or audio feedback was
provided to participants.
A 20% deviation of the accelerator or brake pedal from
the neutral position constituted a single constant maximum
acceleration or deceleration of the virtual car, respectively
until the end of the trial. A 45◦ clockwise rotation of the
steering wheel initiated a single lateral exit of the partici-
pant’s car onto the roadside, followed by an immediate stop.
Participants were only able to select one, unique action (i.e.,
maximum acceleration, maximum braking or a roadside exit)
during the course of one trial. Although it was impossible for
participants to control the maneuver once it has been initi-
ated, the experimental setup reproduced real-life constraints
in emergency situations where the action initiation time is
crucial.
VIRTUAL WORLD
From the participant’s viewpoint, the visual scene was composed
of an intersection formed by two straight, orthogonal roads, the
cockpit of the virtual car, an oncoming car traveling orthogonally
to participant’s displacement and a blue sky (Figure 1). The driv-
ing environment consisted of a conventional two-lane, 7-m wide
cement road in a flat rural environment. The right-hand side of
lanes was delimited by a continuous white line and the left by a
discontinuous white line. A 3.5-m wide gravel bank and a 3.5-
m wide pavement bordered by trees were displayed on the right-
and left-hand sides of the road, respectively. The participant’s
lane was crossed orthogonally by a 3.5-m wide single lane road
bordered by trees. An oncoming vehicle approached the intersec-
tion on this road. A white horizontal line and two checkerboard
panels attached to poles marked the beginning of the experi-
mental space. The participant’s car and the oncoming car were
displayed as 3D blue and red models of a 4 × 4 Hyundai ix35,
respectively. Both cars were 4.41m long, 2.13m wide, and 1.68m
high.
PROCEDURE
Participants were divided into three groups according to the
maximum deceleration of the virtual car: 5 m/s² Dmax (the
low group), 10 m/s² Dmax (the high group) and ∞ m/s² Dmax
(the inf group, able to stop instantaneously). The experiment
was divided into four phases: deceleration calibration, accelera-
tion calibration, familiarization and the experimental phase. At
the beginning of each phase, participants automatically moved
through an empty rural environment at a constant velocity along
the longitudinal road axis for 5 s before the trial actually started.
During this period, any pedal action by participants was ignored
by the simulator. A digital 3 s countdown preceded the actual trial.
At this point, the oncoming vehicle (or an immobile barrier, see
the deceleration calibration in the next section) appeared and the
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velocity of the participant’s car did not change unless they manip-
ulated the pedals or the steering wheel. It is important to note
that participants were not allowed to continuously regulate their
displacement; they could only initiate either a maximum acceler-
ation or deceleration. The trial ended when the participant’s car
was 10m beyond the intersection or had stopped.
The deceleration calibration phase was designed to enable par-
ticipants to calibrate the maximum deceleration (Dmax) of the
virtual car. Participants were instructed to stop in front of a red
and white barrier placed just before the intersection. Specifically,
they were asked to initiate the driving maneuver with the maxi-
mum braking capabilities of their car at the last possible moment.
The initial distance between the participant’s car and the barrier,
and the participant’s initial velocity weremanipulated to create six
CTstop values (depending on the group). CTstop is defined as the
last time to stop safely by braking at Dmax (see the Supplementary
Material for a mathematical definition, Independent Variables
subsection and Table 1 for initial values). In sum, the partici-
pant’s task was to brake at a time as close as possible to the CTstop.
Conditions were allocated randomly and repeated twice. A trial
was recorded as successful when the participant braked at least
0.55 s before the CTstop or at most 0.20 s after it. A braking time
of t = CTstop – 0.55 s meant that they had stopped 14m before
the barrier (on average). Conversely, a maneuver initiated at t
= CTstop + 0.20 s meant that they had stopped 5m after it (on
average). The superior tolerance was weaker than the inferior
tolerance in order to discourage participants from braking after
the CTstop as this decision led to a collision.
The acceleration calibration phase was designed to enable par-
ticipants to calibrate the maximum acceleration (Amax) of their
virtual car. Participants were instructed to cross the intersection
before an oncoming car moving at a constant velocity reached the
intersection and blocked the crossing. Thus, drivers had to initiate
the driving maneuver with the maximum acceleration capabili-
ties of their car at the last possible moment. Their distance to the
intersection and their initial velocity, and the distance between the
oncoming car and the intersection and its velocity were manipu-
lated to create six CTcross values (the same for each group). CTcross
is defined as the last time to cross safely the intersection by accel-
erating at Amax (see the Appendix for a mathematical definition,
Table 1 | Initial kinematics of intersection-crossing situations during calibration and experimental phases.
Phase Stopping possibilities Intersection-crossing situation Crossing
possibilities
CTstop (s) Driver’s car initial kinematics Oncoming car initial kinematics CTcross (s)
Low High Inf TTCs (s) Distance (m) Velocity (m/s) Distance (m) Velocity (m/s) TTCo (s) All groups
Calibration 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 63.40 20.00 42.61 12.88 3.19 1.50
1.45 2.25 3.05 3.05 52.10 16.00 34.70 10.03 3.31 1.75
1.40 2.50 3.60 3.60 82.50 22.00 55.97 14.49 3.76 2.00
1.36 2.75 4.16 4.16 119.70 28.00 82.00 18.94 4.25 2.25
1.25 3.00 4.75 4.75 169.50 35.00 116.85 24.09 4.79 2.50
1.65 3.25 4.85 4.85 158.50 32.00 109.15 21.92 4.91 2.75
Experiment −1.50 0.50 2.50 2.50 103.30 40.00 70.53 27.52 2.51 0.00
−1.50 0.50 2.50 2.50 103.30 40.00 70.53 26.22 2.63 1.50
−1.50 0.50 2.50 2.50 103.30 40.00 70.53 25.91 2.66 2.50
−0.50 1.00 2.51 2.51 78.30 30.00 53.04 20.53 2.51 0.00
−0.50 1.00 2.51 2.51 78.30 30.00 53.04 19.27 2.67 1.50
−0.50 1.00 2.51 2.51 78.30 30.00 53.04 18.96 2.72 2.50
0.45 1.50 2.55 2.55 56.80 21.00 38.00 14.30 2.55 0.00
0.45 1.50 2.55 2.55 56.80 21.00 38.00 13.11 2.78 1.50
0.45 1.50 2.55 2.55 56.80 21.00 38.00 12.78 2.85 2.50
0.25 2.00 3.75 3.75 134.60 35.00 92.43 25.43 3.57 0.00
0.25 2.00 3.75 3.75 134.60 35.00 92.43 23.99 3.79 1.50
0.25 2.00 3.75 3.75 134.60 35.00 92.43 23.41 3.88 2.50
1.55 2.50 3.46 3.46 69.00 19.00 46.53 13.85 3.25 0.00
1.55 2.50 3.46 3.46 69.00 19.00 46.53 12.58 3.58 1.50
1.55 2.50 3.46 3.46 69.00 19.00 46.53 12.09 3.72 2.50
1.75 3.00 4.25 4.25 109.60 25.00 74.94 18.80 3.90 0.00
1.75 3.00 4.25 4.25 109.60 25.00 74.94 17.40 4.22 1.50
1.75 3.00 4.25 4.25 109.60 25.00 74.94 16.79 4.37 2.50
Intersection distances, velocities and time to contact referred to the intersection (TTCs and TTCo) are reported for both participant and oncoming cars. CTcross and
CTstop values are computed from the maximum acceleration and braking capabilities of the driven car and from the initial kinematics of the oncoming and participant
cars.
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Independent Variables subsection and Table 1 for initial values).
Here, the participant’s task was to accelerate as close as pos-
sible to CTcross. These conditions were randomly allocated and
repeated twice. A trial was recorded as successful when the par-
ticipant decided to accelerate at a time at least 0.55 s before the
CTcross or a maximum of 0.20 s after it. If participants decided
to accelerate at t = CTcross – 0.55 s, they crossed the intersection
before the oncoming obstacle with a safety margin of 8m (on
average). Conversely, if they initiated the maneuver at a time later
than t = CTcross + 0.20 s, they collided with the oncoming car as
the average safety margin was –0.5m.
In each calibration trial, success was indicated to the partici-
pant by a green symbol and failure by a red symbol. Participants
performed 12 trials in each calibration sub-phase. The 12-trial
sequence ended when the participant had successfully completed
at least eight trials. Otherwise, the 12-trial sequence was repeated
until they met this criterion.
During the experimental phase, an oncoming car moved
orthogonally at a constant velocity (see Table 1 for velocity val-
ues) toward the intersection and stopped in the participant’s
lane, blocking the road. In each trial, participants had to decide
whether to cross, stop or exit. They could either try to cross the
intersection before the oncoming car arrived by initiating a maxi-
mum acceleration before it was too late to cross safely (i.e., before
the CTcross). Otherwise, they could decide to stop before they
reached the intersection by initiating a braking maneuver before
it was no longer possible to stop safely (i.e., before the CTstop).
As a last resort, they could decide to bail out by steering into
the emergency lane to ensure their safety. In any given trial, they
selected one of these three actions, which were indicated in real
time by “GO,” “STOP,” and “OUT” messages displayed on the
screen to provide an augmented feedback about the maneuver
selected. At the end of each trial a green symbol informed the par-
ticipants that they had not collided with the oncoming car, while
a red symbol indicated a collision. No feedback was provided
when participants bailed out; this was to discourage them from
abusing this emergency alternative. The entire experiment lasted
approximately one and a half hours. A short familiarization phase
preceded the experimental phase. In this phase, the participant
was exposed once to the 18 experimental conditions.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The independent variables and their respective contribution to
the success of participant’s maneuver are illustrated in Figure 2.
The maximum acceleration of the virtual car (Amax) was set to
2 m/s² for all groups. The maximum deceleration (Dmax) was a
between-group variable. As mentioned above, participants were
divided into three groups according to the maximum deceler-
ation of the virtual car: 5m/s² Dmax (the low group), 10 m/s²
Dmax (the high group) and ∞m/s² Dmax (the inf group). As the
inf group was able to stop instantaneously at any given moment,
they only had to decide whether to cross. Consequently, differ-
ences in the behavior of the inf group and the other groups
made it possible to compare the influence of a single cross-ability
affordance and choice between cross-ability and stop-ability
affordances.
The CTcross (i.e., the critical time at which the minimum sat-
isfying acceleration to safely cross the intersection, denoted MSA,
FIGURE 2 | A geometric illustration of the intersection at the
beginning of the trial (A), and relevant variables plotted over time
(B). (A) The left-hand side illustrates a typical intersection encountered
by the driver at the beginning of the trial (t = 0). The 2D coordinates of
the participant (xs(0), ys(0)) and the oncoming car (xo (0), yo (0)) refer to
the center of the vehicles (black dot). The arrows indicate the direction
of movement and its sizes represent the relative velocities of the
participant and the oncoming cars (denoted vs (0) and v0 (0),
respectively). (B) The right-hand side illustrates the evolution of the
minimum satisfying acceleration to safely cross the intersection (MSA,
green line) and the minimum satisfying deceleration to stop just before it
(MSD, red line) if the driver does not initiate any action. The participant’s
car has a maximum acceleration capability Amax (green hatched area) and
a maximum deceleration capability Dmax (red hatched area). These
capabilities define the limits of the driver’s possibilities. Crossing
possibilities are specified by CTcross, the critical time at which the MSA
exceeds the participant’s Amax. Stopping possibilities are specified by
CTstop , the critical time at which the MSD exceeds the participant’s Dmax.
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exceeds the driver’s maximum acceleration capabilities Amax) and
the CTstop (i.e., the critical time at which the minimum satisfy-
ing deceleration to safely stop, denoted MSD, exceeds the driver’s
maximum braking capabilities Dmax) were between-trials vari-
ables. The computations of these variables are defined in the
Supplementary Material.
The experimental conditions were created by adjusting the
extrinsic features of the intersection between trials. Hence, we
manipulated the distance from the drivers to the intersection
and their initial velocity, and the distance between the oncoming
car and the intersection and its velocity for each of the three
groups (Table 1). This created 18 intersection-crossing combina-
tions, which were randomly sorted and repeated five times. These
combinations resulted in three CTcross values (the latest time it
was possible to cross safely by accelerating at Amax) that were
applied to each group (0.00, 1.50, and 2.50 s), and six CTstop val-
ues (the latest time it was possible to stop safely by braking at
Dmax) that ranged from −1.50 to 4.25 s depending on the brak-
ing capability of the virtual car (the ranges were different for each
group). The ratio between the initial distance of the oncoming car
and the initial distance of the participant’s car was adjusted so that
the oncoming car was always initially located 35◦ to the left of the
participant’s field of view.
CTcross and CTstop values specified the last moment (relative
to the beginning of the trial) at which the maximum acceleration
and deceleration had to be initiated in order to cross or stop safely,
respectively. Therefore, from a functional point of view, positive,
negative and null values of CTcross and CTstop indicated safe cross-
ing and stopping after, before and at the beginning of the trial,
respectively. For example, a CTstop equal to 2.50 s meant that the
driver could initiate a deceleration at a maximum of 2.50 s after
the beginning of the trial (i.e., later than in a trial with a CTstop
value equal to 1.50 s). Conversely, a CTstop value equal to −1.50 s
meant that at the beginning of the trial, it was already impossible
to stop safely (by 1.50 s).
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The dependent variable was the decision selected by each
participant (i.e., to cross, stop, or to exit), the time at which the
pedal corresponding to the selected decision was pushed and the
number of collisions with the oncoming car. We computed the
individual frequency of each decision as the ratio of the num-
ber of decision types over the number of trials and focused on
crossing frequency as a function of CTcross and CTstop conditions.
We computed the individual average decision time for the overall
trials (independently of the occurrence of collisions).
PREDICTIONS
Our initial hypothesis was that the selection of driving maneuvers
was driven by the perception of the corresponding affordance. In
other words, crossing frequency would increase with the viability
of crossing possibilities and stopping frequency would increase
with the viability of stopping possibilities. Finally, drivers were
expected to exit the road when it was not possible to either cross
or stop.
Based on the frequency of crossing maneuvers, we tested the
hypothesis of the choice between cross-ability and stop-ability
affordances when drivers have to select the best maneuver at
the approach to an intersection. From an extrinsic viewpoint, all
groups of drivers experienced identical intersection-crossing situ-
ations. However, from an intrinsic viewpoint, stopping possibili-
ties (CTstop) were manipulated between groups by varying maxi-
mum braking capabilities (Dmax). Crossing possibilities (CTcross)
were not manipulated between groups as maximum acceleration
(Amax) was kept constant. Therefore, if the stop-ability affordance
played a role in decision-making, the manipulation of Dmaxwas
expected to affect the average crossing frequency. More specifi-
cally, the low Dmax group was expected to cross the intersection at
a higher frequency on average than the high Dmax group because
the former had lower braking capabilities.
We investigated the choice between affordances hypothesis in
more detail by examining, for each group, the effect of CTcross and
CTstop. As described earlier, the three CTcross values (0.00, 1.50,
and 2.50 s) were combined with six different CTstop values, yield-
ing a total of 18 intersection-crossing situations. Depending on
the intersection-crossing situation and Dmax, drivers encountered
CTstop values ranging from−1.50 to 1.75, 0.50 to 3.00, and 2.50 to
4.25 s for the low, high and inf groups, respectively. We predicted
that in the inf group (that only had to handle the cross-ability
affordance, given that drivers could stop instantly) crossing fre-
quency would increase with CTcross, while CTstop would have no
effect. For the low and high groups, we expected to see a combined
effect of CTcross and CTstop on the average crossing frequency.
This would demonstrate that CTcross and CTstop, as formalized
in this experiment, contribute to choice between affordances. We
expected that the crossing frequency would increase with increas-
ing CTcross in the same way for each group, and would increase
with decreasing CTstop, more so for the low group exposed to low
CTstop values (CTstop = 0.33 s on average) than for the high group
exposed to higher CTstop values (CTstop = 1.75 s on average).
RESULTS
CALIBRATION
Our first analysis checked that all groups had successfully cali-
brated their virtual maximum deceleration (Dmax) and accelera-
tion (Amax) during the calibration phase. Drivers were assumed to
have calibrated their Amax and Dmax when they succeeded in 8 out
of 12 trials in acceleration and braking calibration tasks. We ana-
lyzed the number of 12-trial sequences required to achieve this
criterion and the overall success rate for all groups. Participants
in the three groups calibrated Dmax in 2.30 ± 0.95, 1.90 ± 0.88,
and 1.10 ± 0.32 sequences of 12 trials with a final success rate
equal to 9.40 ± 1.17, 9.00 ± 0.94, and 10.50 ± 1.08 trials, for
the low, high and inf groups, respectively. Participants calibrated
Amax in 3.00 ± 1.05, 3.00 ± 1.70, and 3.50 ± 1.08 sequences
of 12 trials with a success rate in the last 12-trial sequence
equal to 9.10 ± 1.79, 8.80 ± 0.92, and 9.10 ± 1.37 trials, for
the low, high and inf groups, respectively. In sum, participants
quickly calibrated their maximum action capabilities. The cal-
ibration time for Dmax increased as Dmax decreased, while the
calibration time for Amax was constant across groups. Finally, the
similarity in the final success rates achieved by all groups suggests
that all participants had a similar level of competence before the
experimental phase.
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COLLISIONS
Our analyses then investigated differences in collision frequency
according to group and decision type. Despite the similar success
rates at the end of the crossing and stopping calibration phases,
the three groups of participants collided with the oncoming car
at different frequencies (24.56 ± 5.25, 14.00 ± 3.40, and 8.22 ±
4.92% for the low, high and inf groups, respectively). Moreover,
the decision to cross led to more collisions (17.00 ± 4.69, 9.22 ±
3.78, and 8.22 ± 4.92%) than the decision to stop (7.56 ± 3.66,
4.78 ± 2.35, and 0% for the low, high and inf groups, respec-
tively). Overall, these results show that the risk of collision due
to the decision to cross increased with a decrease in maximum
braking capabilities.
DECISION TIME
Thirdly, analyses aimed at investigating the changes in
driver’s decision time depending on groups, decision type
and intersection-crossing situations. Decision time did not
appear to differ between the low and high groups (0.81 ± 0.20
and 0.91 ± 0.21 s) but increased for the inf group (1.53 ± 0.42 s).
Moreover, decision time for crossing, stopping and exiting (0.78
± 0.27, 1.29 ± 0.61 and 1.48 ± 0.47 s, respectively) was in most
cases in an ascending order (consistent with instructions), with
the inf group showing a large tendency to decide stopping later
than crossing. This suggests that the participants of the inf group
exploited their braking possibility as a last resort, in opposition
to the other groups that had to choose between affordances.
We further focused on the influence of intersection-crossing
situations on the average decision time. We noted that CTstop and
TTCs (Time to Contact of the driver’s car referred to the intersec-
tion) co-varied in our intersection-crossing situations (Table 1).
Their respective contributions on decision time was thus assessed
for the three groups with comparisons of percentage of variance
of decision time provided by separate linear regressions between
these two predictors and decision time, respectively. TTCs was
found to better account for the variations of decision time than
CTstop (85.54, 80.63, and 77.37% vs. 35.15, 65.59, and 77.37%
the low, high and inf groups, respectively). The decision time
increased with the increase of TTCs (ranging from 0.66 to 1.05,
0.71 to 1.15, and 1.11 to 2.00 s for the low, high and inf groups,
respectively). However, the influence of TTCs was more impor-
tant for the inf group than for the other groups. Finally, the deci-
sion time of the inf group decreased and was equal to 1.72, 1.49,
and 1.37 s when CTcross increased and were equal to 0.00, 1.50 and
2.50 s, respectively. On the contrary, the decision time remained
quite constant for the low (0.87, 0.78, and 0.77 s) and high groups
(0.99, 0.87, and 0.85 s) across manipulations of CTcross.
In sum, we reported that the decision time tends to decrease
when CTcross increased for the inf group. Moreover, decision time
increased when TTCs increased with a more important intensity
for the inf group than for the other groups. The low and high
group being limited in their maximum acceleration and decelera-
tion capabilities took their behavioral decision earlier than the inf
group which was only limited by a maximum acceleration.
DECISION FREQUENCY
The final and most important analysis investigated changes in
the frequency of driving maneuvers across groups depending on
FIGURE 3 | Inter-individual average frequency of driving maneuvers
(crossing, stopping and bailing out) for the low (Dmax = 5m/s²), high
(Dmax = 10m/s²) and inf (Dmax = ∞m/s²) deceleration groups,
respectively. While the theoretical maximum crossing frequency
corresponds to 12 out of the 18 trials (∼66%) for which the initial CTcross
was positive for all groups, crossing frequencies decrease with the
increase of stopping possibilities. Vertical bars indicate standard error of
individual means.
their crossing and stopping possibilities during the experimental
phase. Figure 3 shows that the frequency of all driving maneu-
vers (crossing, stopping and exiting) varied as a function of the
between-group manipulation of Dmax. As deceleration capability
(Dmax) increased, drivers attempted less often to cross the inter-
section (65.22 ± 12.78, 50.00 ± 13.66, and 42.89 ± 17.48% for
the low, high and inf groups, respectively). In parallel, as Dmax
increased, drivers decided to stopmore frequently (21.78± 13.12,
46.56 ± 13.75, and 57.00 ± 17.51% for the low, high and inf
groups, respectively). Finally, as Dmax increased, drivers exited less
often (13.00 ± 11.10, 3.44 ± 4.64, and 0.11 ± 0.35% for the low,
high and inf groups, respectively).
These differences in the frequency of stopping and exiting sug-
gest a mixed perception of related affordances. The increase in
the frequency of the decision to stop as Dmax increased corre-
sponded to an increase in stopping possibilities, as average CTstop
values increased with Dmax. Similarly, the decrease in the fre-
quency of the decision to exit as Dmax increased corresponded to
a decrease in intersection-crossing situations where there were no
crossing or stopping possibilities (i.e., CTcross and CTstop were less
than or equal to zero at the start of the trial). Exiting maneuvers
were observed in 13% of trials for the low group, while 11% of
intersection-crossing situations prevented both safe crossing and
stopping. On the other hand, the frequency of exiting in high and
inf groups, which never encountered such situations, was close to
zero.
However, the observed changes in crossing frequency with
Dmax suggested that there was a choice between a cross-ability
affordance, directly related to the crossing action, and a stop-
ability affordance that was a priori irrelevant to the decision
to cross. As CTcross conditions were identical for all groups,
changes in crossing frequency as a function of CTcross would tend
to confirm that crossing possibilities influenced the decision to
cross, independently of the group. In parallel, given that stopping
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possibilities were a priori only relevant to braking maneuvers and
that they co-varied with Dmax, the Dmax effect on crossing fre-
quency would suggest that there is a choice between stopping and
crossing possibilities when performing the crossing maneuver.
In order to investigate the choice between crossing and stop-
ping affordances, a Two-Way ANOVA (CTcross [0.00, 1.50, 2.50]×
group [low, high, inf]) with CTcross as a repeated measure was
performed on crossing frequencies. Post-hoc comparisons were
conducted using Newman–Keuls a posteriori tests. The ANOVA
showed a significant main effect of CTcross [F(2, 54) = 67.16, p <
0.05]. Post-hoc analyses showed that crossing frequency signif-
icantly increased with each increase of CTcross (p < 0.05). The
ANOVA also showed a significant main effect of group [F(2, 27) =
5.96, p < 0.05]. Post-hoc analyses showed that the crossing fre-
quency was significantly higher for the low group than for the
other groups. The group × CTcross interaction was not significant
[F(4, 54) = 1.39, p > 0.05].
In brief, our results showed that crossing frequency increased
with CTcross for all groups. Between-group differences were
observed in crossing frequency, although all groups experienced
identical intersection-crossing situations and had identical max-
imum acceleration capabilities. Taken together, these results sug-
gest that both crossing and stopping possibilities play a role in the
decision to cross.
As CTstop co-varied with Dmax and CTstop conditions were
different for each group (see Table 1), the influence of CTstop
can only be investigated by carrying out three separate Two-
Way ANOVAs (CTcross × CTstop) with repeated measures on
CTcross and CTstop on crossing frequency. Figure 4 depicts the
change in average crossing frequency as a function of CTcross
and CTstop. For each group, the ANOVAs again revealed a main
effect of CTcross [F(2, 18) = 25.06; F(2, 18) = 20.96 and F(2, 18) =
25.85, p < 0.05 for the low, high and inf groups, respectively].
For all groups, post-hoc analyses revealed that the crossing fre-
quency observed for CTcross = 0 was significantly lower than that
seen in the other CTcross conditions (p < 0.05). The ANOVA
also revealed a main effect of CTstop for low and high groups
[F(5, 45) < 9.59; F(5, 45) = 3.59, p < 0.05 for the low and high
groups, respectively]. Post-hoc analyses showed that the cross-
ing frequency displayed by the low group during the negative
CTstop conditions (CTstop = −1.50 and −0.50) were significantly
higher (p < 0.05) when compared separately to those displayed
in otherCTstop conditions (except forCTstop = 0.45). Concerning
the high group, the crossing frequency observed for the low-
est CTstop value (CTstop = 0.50) was significantly higher than
in all conditions for which CTstop ≥ 1.50 (p < 0.05, except for
CTstop = 2.00). No significant main effect of CTstop was found
for the inf group [F(5, 45) = 0.30, p > 0.05]. Finally, no sig-
nificant CTcross × CTstop interaction was found [F(10, 90) = 0.55;
F(10, 90) = 1.42; F(10, 90) = 1.75, p > 0.05 for the low, high and
inf groups, respectively].
In sum, drivers attempted to cross the intersection more often,
not only as CTcross increased (for all three groups), but also as
CTstop decreased (for the low and high groups). As predicted, only
the crossing affordance seemed to influence the inf group (where
braking capabilities were infinite). Concerning the other groups,
the increase in crossing frequency was higher in the low group
(where the CTstop was low) than the high group (where the CTstop
was higher). It seems that the frequency of crossing maneuvers
results from a choice between crossing and stopping affordances
(characterized by CTcross and CTstop, respectively) for the low and
high groups.
DECISION FREQUENCY: MODEL
Based on our statistical results and mathematical constraints,
we designed an a posteriori model able to quantify this choice
between crossing and stopping affordances using the average
inter-individual crossing frequency for the three groups. In the
model, crossing frequency was only influenced by main effects of
CTcross and CTstop. Indeed, in the low and high groups crossing
frequency increased with CTcross and decreased with CTstop with
no significant CTcross × CTstop interaction. Consequently, for the
low and high groups, the crossing frequency was modeled as a
sum of two functions: an increasing CTcross function, denoted f ,
and a decreasing CTstop function, denoted g. The behavior of the
inf group, which was assumed to be immune from choice between
CTcross and CTstop affordances due to its infinite Dmax, was mod-
eled differently. The ANOVA analysis of this group’s behavior
revealed a main positive effect of CTcross but no main effect of
CTstop. We thus modeled the crossing frequency of the inf group
with a single increasing CTcross function, denoted f . We used
the same function f for the three groups as the group × CTcross
interaction was found to be non-significant.
The best mathematical formula found to describe f and g
were sigmoid-type functions. Such functions were widely used to
model verbal (Oudejans et al., 1996; Fajen andMatthis, 2011) and
motor responses (Ishak et al., 2008) to affordances (see Franchak
and Adolph, 2014 for a review about the use of probabilistic func-
tions to model affordances; and Gescheider, 1997 for classical
literature from which this habit was borrowed). A visual inspec-
tion of Figure 4 suggested that the negative effect of CTstop on
crossing frequency was exponential, with a plateau in crossing fre-
quency for the lowest and highest CTstop values. The change in





1+e−b·CTstop , where b ≤ 0 is a coefficient
modulating the slope of the crossing frequency (i.e., the lower b,
the lower the slope of the sigmoid).We used a similar sigmoid for-
mula to model the positive effect of CTcross on crossing frequency:
f (CTcross) = 11+e−a·CTcross where a ≥ 0 is the coefficient that mod-
ulates the slope of the crossing frequency. It should be noted that
other mathematical functions would have been equally good can-
didates to fit this three point pattern. Moreover, in order to model
the crossing frequency in the theoretical 0–100% range, another
mathematical constraint was added. We modulated the action of
f and g functions such that their sum never exceeded 100 using
w and 1 − w weightings, with w ranging from 0 to 1. The choice
between CTcross and CTstop on predicted crossing frequency was
finally modeled as follows:
F˜cross = 100 ×
[
w





We used the Gauss–Newton algorithm to estimate the set of coef-
ficients a, b, and w that minimize the sum of squares of residuals
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FIGURE 4 | Inter-individual average crossing frequency plotted as a
function of CTcross and CTstop for the three groups (a circle, square, and a
pyramid represent the low, high and inf groups, respectively). The
exponential rise (gray curve) models the driver’s tendency to cross the
intersectionascrossingpossibilities (CTcross) increaseandstoppingpossibilities
(CTstop ) decrease. Vertical bars show standard error of individual means.
between the data and our model. With an identical set of coeffi-
cients for each group (a = 1.67, b = −1.69, and w = 0.57), the
model offers a coefficient of determination equal to 0.84 and thus
accurately reproduces our observations (Figure 4). The quality of
this adjustment to our data can be further established by noting
that this R² is close to the maximal theoretical R² equal to 0.92.
This theoretical R² can be computed using, as a model for cross-
ing frequency, a sum of a polynomial of degree 17 in CTstop (6
CTstop modalities × 3 groups – 1, corresponding to the degrees of
freedom related to CTstop) and a polynomial of degree 2 in CTcross
(3CTcross modalities−1, corresponding to the degrees of freedom
related to CTcross). We considered the maximum theoretical value
to be 0.92 as we did not observe a significant CTcross × CTstop
interaction, theoretically explaining 8% of variance. Moreover,
the low standard deviations of the coefficients (std = 0.56, 0.50,
and 0.03 for a, b, and w coefficients, respectively) demonstrated
their stability and confirmed that the model provided relevant
predictions. A Student’s t-test based on a t-distribution with
n − k = 51 degrees of freedom (n and k refer to the number of
points and the number of coefficients, respectively) tested the null
hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero and demonstrated
their significance.
First, the 1−w
1+e−b·CTstop term accounts for the observed expo-
nential increase in crossing frequency with CTstop, especially
for the low group exposed to CTstop values ranging from
1.75 to −1.50 s. The predicted crossing frequency exponentially
increases as CTstop values decrease until a maximum crossing
frequency is reached when CTstop values drop below −1.50 s.
Second, this term is close to zero when CTstop exceeds 2.00 s
and no longer influences the crossing frequency. Therefore, in
accordance with the statistical analysis, the crossing frequency
model (Equation 1) can be reduced to a simpler formalization
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for the inf group exposed to CTstop times higher than 2.50 s:





. Third, the w
1+e−a·CTcross term accounts
for a similar increase in the modeled crossing frequency with
CTcross among the three groups. This is explained by their iden-
tical exposure to the three CTcross times (0.00, 1.50, and 2.50 s) for
a given CTstop value.
In conclusion, the proposed model accurately reproduces our
observations and predicts choice betweenCTcross andCTstop affor-
dances for the average inter-individual crossing frequency. The
model not only showed that manipulations of CTcross induced
changes in crossing frequency but also that manipulation of
CTstop modulated variation in crossing frequency. Finally, the
model is able to account for the crossing frequency for all three
groups with different action capabilities but identical coeffi-
cients. This supports the formalization of CTcross and CTstop as
affordances, which are extrinsic properties of the intersection-
crossing situations scaled to the driver’s maximum acceleration
and deceleration capabilities, respectively.
DISCUSSION
ROLE OF CROSSING AND STOPPING POSSIBILITIES ON DRIVER’S
DECISION FREQUENCY
Do driving maneuvers at the approach to an intersection emerge
from choice between driving possibilities? Theoretically, drivers
assess the viability of crossing the intersection based on traffic
constraints and the acceleration of their car. However, at the same
time, they assess the viability of performing a safe stop before
the intersection based on their braking capability. Inspired by
the original concepts of FST and MSZ introduced by Gibson
and Crooks (1938), we formalized the viability of crossing as
the critical time at which safe crossing is no longer possible
(CTcross) and the viability of stopping as the critical time at
which it is no longer possible to stop safely before the intersec-
tion (CTstop). In other words, CTcross is the critical time at which
the minimum satisfying acceleration for safe crossing (MSA)
exceeds the driver’s maximum acceleration (Amax). In the same
way, CTstop is the critical time at which the minimum satisfying
deceleration for safe crossing (MSD) exceeds the driver’s maxi-
mum braking capabilities (Dmax). We tested the hypothesis that
the decision taken by the driver is the result of choice between
these crossing and stopping possibilities. We thus investigated
the respective contribution of CTcross and CTstop to the decision
taken by a driver when approaching an intersection in a driving
simulator.
Three groups of participants drove cars with identical accelera-
tion capabilities but different braking capabilities and were asked
to try to cross an intersection before an oncoming car traveling
orthogonally blocked the route. Alternatively, they could decide
to stop before the intersection to let the oncoming car cross.
Finally, as a last resort, they could decide to exit on the roadside.
Since acceleration capability (Amax) was constant for the three
groups, between-group intersection-crossing situations offered
identical crossing possibilities (CTcross). However, between-group
differences in braking capabilities (Dmax) created different stop-
ping possibilities (CTstop). We hypothesized that frequency of
the decision to cross would increase as the viability of stopping
decreased, although the viability of crossing was constant for all
groups.
We consistently observed that crossing frequency increased as
the critical time for crossing (CTcross) increased, irrespective of the
group and the between-trial manipulation of CTstop. This result
suggests that drivers perceive CTcross as a variable that specifies
the viability of crossing and underlines the driver’s sensitivity to
affordances that rely onmaximum acceleration capabilities (Fajen
and Matthis, 2011). Moreover, we found between- and within-
group differences which showed that crossing frequency increased
as CTstop decreased. Although previous studies have shown that
drivers are sensitive to affordances based on maximum decelera-
tion capabilities, such as in a braking task (Fajen, 2005b,c), it is
surprising to see the influence of braking capabilities on cross-
ing decisions in our results. Finally, we found that the frequency
of exiting increased when the combination of CTcross and CTstop
ruled out crossing and stopping possibilities. Overall, these obser-
vations confirm that drivers take both the viability of crossing and
stopping into account at the approach to an intersection.
POTENTIAL PERCEPTUAL PROCESSES UNDERLYING THE DRIVER’S
ASSESSMENT OF CROSSING POSSIBILITIES
The influence of the car’s braking capabilities on crossing fre-
quency is the core result of this experiment. It raises questions
about the mechanisms that combine crossing and stopping possi-
bilities inmaking the final decision.Whatmechanism, underlying
choice between the possibilities for action, could explain the influ-
ence of the driver’s stopping possibilities on crossing frequency?
In theory, all groups of drivers have an identical perception of
their crossing possibilities, but our results show that in prac-
tice their stopping possibilities play a role in this assessment.
Drivers appear to decide to cross an intersection not only because
crossing is a very viable possibility, but also because stopping
is not. This result is supported by our model, which suggests
that drivers simultaneously assess crossing and stopping possibil-
ities and weigh each of them. Moreover, our model is compatible
with results from traditional affordance paradigms, as it explains
behavior when drivers are exposed to a unique affordance (the
inf group in our experiment). The following paragraphs evaluate
candidate mechanisms which may explain these results.
We first ruled out a mechanism that consisted of the manipu-
lation of the experimental instructions, i.e., drivers first assessed
their crossing possibilities and then their stopping possibilities.
This hypothesis would have led to similar between-group cross-
ing frequencies for intersection-crossing situations where the safe
crossing possibilities were identical. Moreover, stopping and exit-
ing frequencies of all groups would have varied depending on
stopping possibilities in situations with identical crossing possi-
bilities. Although the observed stopping and exiting frequencies
are compatible with this hypothesis, the different between-group
crossing frequencies invalidate it.
It could be argued that the combined effect of crossing and
stopping possibilities on crossing frequency is due to the fact that
drivers do not perceive their crossing possibilities in the same
way. In this case, a single affordance (perhaps including crossing
and stopping possibilities) would sum up the decision-making
process. Our implementations of critical times at which it is
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no longer safe to cross or stop in reference to the driver-
intersection system are well-suited for the investigation of this
kind of hypothesis. Indeed, considering that decision-making is
based on critical times for both safe crossing and stopping pos-
sibilities is compatible with the idea that crossing possibilities
are perceived in reference with the stopping possibilities. For
instance, ifCTcross = 1.5 s andCTstop = 3 s, these values will spec-
ify that safe stopping is afforded 1.5 s longer than safe crossing.
Nevertheless, our statistical analysis, supported by a model that
explains behavior given an identical set of CTcross and CTstop coef-
ficients, suggests that these variables are separate affordances,
among which drivers choose. In other words, drivers would
identically perceive their possibilities to cross the intersection
but would act in a different way depending on their stopping
possibilities.
Alternatively, the final decision to select a given driving
maneuver could be understood using a behavioral dynamics
framework (Warren, 1998, 2006). In this framework, the final
decision is consistent with a dynamic system. The possibility that
offers the best chance of success among other available possibili-
ties is the attractor for the final selection of a maneuver. On the
other hand, the possibility that offers the least chance of suc-
cess acts as a repeller in the final decision. This framework has
been shown to account for route selection when steering, and
avoiding obstacles in a complex environment (Fajen and Warren,
2003). Therefore, in our study, competing driving possibilities
may act as the angular acceleration of the goal and the obstacle
in the Fajen and Warren’s steering task study and motivate the
final decision as a function of their respective attractive or repul-
sive power. Further work needs to be carried out to confirm this
hypothesis.
CONCLUSION
Following Gibson and Crooks’ footsteps, this experiment has
shown that drivers not only take into account the crossing pos-
sibilities but also the stopping possibilities when performing
cross or not decision at the approach of an intersection. Our
results, supported by a behavioral model of decisionmaking, pro-
vide an empirical support for the hypothesis of choice between
affordances. Further research is needed not only to demonstrate
the relevance of such a framework in the regulation of driv-
ing maneuvers (Fajen, 2005b), but also to evidence the optical
correlates of CTcross and CTstop.
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